The Property Price Register now covers more than sixteen years of Irish home sales, from the bottom of the crash in 2010 to this autumn. On its own it tells you what homes sold for. Put it next to the CSO's figures on population, incomes and house building and it can answer a bigger question: what is actually driving the market? Is it demand, is it a lack of supply, and can people still afford it? We looked at the national picture, the four regions, and two towns: Tullamore and Skibbereen.
The headline: this is a demand-led market running into a supply wall. Since 2010 Ireland has added 971,000 people. House building collapsed to 4,575 homes in 2013 and took a decade to recover. In most years it fell well short of what population growth alone required. So the extra demand went into prices, not into more sales. The typical second-hand home more than doubled from its 2013 low (€160k → €350k) while average earnings rose 46%. Prices have gone from about 3.4× to about 5.1× the typical household income, above the Central Bank's 4× lending limit. Affordability has worsened fastest outside Dublin.
How we built this
For prices we used the same cleaned register as our 36-month market health report. That means full-market-price sales only, prices between €50,000 and €3 million, and bulk "Units 1–76"-style rows removed. Price levels are the median second-hand sale, so a new scheme opening in one area can't pass itself off as a price rise. Everything else comes from the CSO, listed in full at the end.
We split the country into the four regions used across HomeIQ. They are Dublin; the commuter belt (Kildare, Meath, Wicklow, Louth); the counties containing the four other cities (Cork, Galway, Limerick, Waterford); and the rest of Ireland, the other 17 counties. The CSO doesn't publish yearly population or household income by county, so some numbers below are census snapshots or estimates. We say so where they are.
1. The long view: prices against incomes
Measured from 2010, prices and incomes look roughly in step. Prices are up 59%, earnings 45%, and disposable income per person 66% (to 2024). But 2010 is a misleading starting point. Prices were still falling out of the bubble then, and dropped another 27% to a low of €160,000 in 2013. From that low the picture changes completely. Prices rose 119% by 2025. Average earnings rose 46%, and income per person 66% to 2024.
Incomes did not move for the first five years. Average earnings were €36,277 in 2010 and €36,457 in 2015. They only started rising meaningfully in 2017, and fastest after 2020 (+24% from 2020 to 2025). Prices started rising in 2014, about three years before wages did. That timing is the first clue: the early recovery was not driven by people earning more.
2. Demand: a population boom, powered by migration
In 2010 and 2011, about 27,000 more people left Ireland than arrived each year. Net inflows returned in 2015 and have not stopped since. They ran at around 44,000 a year before Covid and jumped to 77,700 and 79,300 in 2023 and 2024, partly reflecting arrivals from Ukraine. They have eased to 48,100 in the year to April 2026. Add natural increase (births minus deaths) and the population went from 4.55 million in 2010 to 5.53 million in 2026, about +21%. In 2022–2024 alone it grew by roughly 100,000 people a year.
Most new arrivals are working-age adults, and most rent first. That pushes up rents. Higher rents then make buying look better value and lift prices. Population growth is only part of the demand, though. The other part is household formation: young adults moving out, separated couples setting up two homes, older people living alone. Across most of Europe average household size has fallen for decades. In Ireland it was 2.73 in 2011, 2.75 in 2016 and 2.74 in 2022. It stood still, which is unusual. Households that would have formed didn't, because there was nowhere to put them. That is hidden demand. It doesn't show up in sales, but it is still waiting for homes.
3. Supply: building recovered, but from almost nothing
After the crash Ireland nearly stopped building. Completions bottomed at 4,575 in 2013. They rose steadily to about 21,000 in 2019, stalled through Covid, then climbed to 36,215 in 2025, eight times the low point. 2026 is on a similar pace, with 16,679 in the first half.
Measured against population growth, the recovery came late. Between 2014 and 2019 the population needed around 11,000–27,000 extra homes a year. From 2014 to 2017 building delivered only about half of that. In 2022–2024, with ~100,000 more people a year, Ireland needed about 36,000–40,000 homes a year and built 29,600–32,500. Over the whole period 2012–2025, population growth alone called for about 323,000 homes. 254,000 were built, a gap of roughly 70,000. That is before replacing any old homes, and before any of the hidden households from the last section.
There is one hopeful sign. In 2025, completions (36,215) clearly exceeded the homes needed for that year's population growth (about 28,600). That has happened in only one other year in the series, 2021, when Covid cut migration. With migration easing, the latest figures suggest building is finally starting to eat into the backlog.
One caveat needs saying clearly: sales are not supply. A completed home only appears on the Property Price Register if it is sold to a private buyer. Of 2025's completions, 5,874 were one-off houses people built for themselves, and many others were social, cost-rental or build-to-rent homes sold in bulk or never sold at all. That's why the register's 13,266 clean new-build sales in 2025 are far below the CSO's 36,215 completions.
The register shows how the market responded. Sales roughly tripled, from about 17,000 in 2011 to 58,000–59,000 in 2022 and 2023, and have flat-lined since. New builds grew from 12% of sales in 2013 to 23% in 2025. The more telling line is second-hand sales. They peaked at about 48,500 in 2022 and have since slipped to about 44,700. Fewer existing owners are putting their homes up for sale. Moving is expensive, and the next home is hard to find, so people stay put. Prices kept rising through all of this, by 8.5% in 2024 and 7.5% in 2025 on the CSO's index. When prices rise faster while sales stay flat, buyers are competing for a fixed number of homes.
4. Affordability: prices have outrun incomes
The ratio of price to household income is the simplest affordability test. On our estimate it fell from 4.6 in 2010 to 3.4 in 2013. Homes were cheap relative to incomes, but almost nobody could get a mortgage. It rose to about 4.3 by 2017–2019, dipped slightly in 2020, and then climbed again to about 5.1 in 2025. The CSO's own measure for 2024, which uses a different income basis, puts the national ratio at 4.7. Using disposable income per person instead of earnings gives about 4.75 for 2025. Whichever measure you take, the typical home now costs more than the 4× income the Central Bank lets a first-time buyer borrow.
That lending limit matters for reading this chart. The Central Bank's mortgage rules came in in 2015 and capped most loans at 3.5× income. Look at what happened next. By 2017 the ratio had levelled off near 4.3, and it stayed there until 2020. Banks could only lend a fixed multiple of income, so incomes effectively capped prices. The ratio started rising again after 2020. Several things happened at once. Savings built up during Covid and became deposits. More buyers were two-income households. The limit for first-time buyers rose to 4× in 2023. Government help for new-build buyers grew, such as Help to Buy. Each of these lets buyers pay more on the same income. When the number of homes can't grow quickly, that extra money goes into higher prices.
Interest rates show the same thing working in reverse. The ECB raised rates from July 2022 to September 2023. Price growth fell from 12.3% in 2022 to 3.1% in 2023. When rates started falling in mid-2024, it picked back up to 8.5%. Higher borrowing costs cut what buyers could pay, and prices reacted within a year.
5. The regions: the squeeze has spread outward
| Region | Population growth 2011–22 | Households added 2011–22 | Homes built 2012–22 | Second-hand median 2013 → 2025 | Price ÷ income 2013 → 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dublin | +14.5% | 52,031 | 50,587 | €240k → €481k (+101%) | 5.1× → 5.5× |
| Commuter belt | +16.8% | 34,671 | 33,911 | €165k → €372k (+125%) | 3.4× → 4.3× |
| Cork, Galway, Limerick, Waterford | +11.5% | 45,853 | 31,751 | €145k → €320k (+121%) | 3.4× → 4.5× |
| Rest of Ireland | +9.0% | 54,389 | 39,105 | €108k → €245k (+127%) | 2.8× → 3.9× |
Population and households: Census 2011 and 2022 (CSO FY003B, FY011B). Homes built: CSO NDA05. Prices: PPR second-hand medians. Price ÷ income: estimated (see method notes).
The commuter belt grew fastest: its population rose 16.8% between the 2011 and 2022 censuses, against 14.5% in Dublin. It is also one of two regions where building kept pace with new households (33,900 homes for 34,700 new households). That is consistent with what we found in our 36-month report: two sales in five in Kildare are now new builds. Dublin roughly matched its new households too (50,600 homes for 52,000). The cities and the rest of Ireland added far more households than homes. The gap was filled by the large number of homes left empty after the crash, and that spare stock has now largely been used up.
Dublin is still the least affordable, at about 5.5× income. But its ratio is barely higher than in 2013 (5.1×), because Dublin incomes have grown faster than those in the cities or rural counties. The real change is everywhere else. Since 2013 the ratio has gone from 3.4× to 4.3× in the commuter belt and from 3.4× to 4.55× in the city counties. In the rest of Ireland it rose from 2.8× to 3.9×, a 40% worsening in affordability and the largest of any region. Second-hand prices there rose 127% from the 2013 low, more than in Dublin (101%), even though their population grew the least.
This is the ripple effect. When Dublin gets too expensive, buyers move to the next cheapest place they can reach: first the commuter counties, then the cities, then the towns beyond. Remote working since 2020 has stretched how far that can go. Local wages in Offaly or West Cork haven't changed much. Buyers bringing Dublin salaries and savings have, and they are bidding against local buyers for the same homes.
6. Two towns up close: Tullamore and Skibbereen
Tullamore (population 15,598 in 2022, up 8.6% since 2011) is a good example of a midlands commuter town. Prices bottomed at €120,000 in 2013 and stayed flat at around €128,000 until 2016. The recovery reached Tullamore about three years after Dublin. Then it accelerated, to €280,000 in 2025 (+133% from the low) and about €295,000 so far in 2026. Building there had almost stopped. The Tullamore electoral area completed only 16–39 homes a year from 2012 to 2018, rising to 221–283 a year in 2022–2024 before dropping to 100 in 2025. The CSO puts the town's median household income at €38,423 in 2016 and €53,484 in 2022. On those figures the price-to-income ratio went from about 3.3× in 2016 to 4.1× in 2022, and on our estimate to about 4.6× by 2025.
Skibbereen (population 2,903) shows a different pattern. Its median household income is low, €37,096 in 2022, yet its typical second-hand home now costs around €285,000, close to the national figure. That is a ratio of about 6.7× local income, higher than Dublin. Local wages can't explain that. Prices are set by buyers whose money was earned somewhere else: holiday-home buyers, retirees, returning emigrants and remote workers. Skibbereen's prices jumped 15% in the 2021 rolling figure alone, as remote working took off. For local first-time buyers, this is affordability at its worst. The town's buyers are competing with people who earn their incomes elsewhere. (Skibbereen's sample is small. Treat its figures as an indication, not a precise measure.)
So what is the data telling us?
What's driving it
- Demand, mostly from population growth. 971,000 more people since 2010, more than half of it net migration since 2015.
- Supply that couldn't respond quickly. A decade of under-building left a gap of about 70,000 homes, plus households that never got to form.
- Prices doing the adjusting. Sales volumes flat-lined after 2022 while prices kept rising, so buyers were competing for a fixed number of homes.
- Credit setting the ceiling. Lending limits tie prices to incomes. Growth is fastest when those limits loosen or rates fall.
Is it affordable?
- Less so every year since 2020. About 5× household income nationally, above the 4× lending limit.
- Worst in Dublin, worsening fastest elsewhere. Rural counties went from 2.8× to 3.9× income.
- Towns depend on outside money. Skibbereen's prices are 6.7× local income.
- Not a credit bubble. Unlike 2006, loans are capped at a multiple of income, so the strain shows up as larger deposits and fewer buyers who qualify, not as risky lending.
Our reading is that Ireland's property market is demand-driven and supply-constrained. The increase in prices since 2013 is about what you'd expect when a fast-growing population meets housing supply that takes years to respond. The register gives no sign that prices are being pushed up by easy credit, as they were before 2008. Lending rules limit how far prices can run ahead of incomes. Within those limits, any extra buying power has gone into higher prices.
What would change the picture? Supply has to stay ahead of demand for several years running. 2025 was the first clear year of that, helped by migration easing from its peak. If completions hold above 35,000 a year while population growth stays near today's ~67,000, the register should show it in two ways. More second-hand homes would come up for sale, and the price-to-income ratio would stop rising. Those are the two things to watch in next year's data.
What this data can and can't tell us
- Sales are not supply. The register records sales to private buyers, not completions. Social, cost-rental, build-to-rent and self-built homes are mostly missing, and bulk sales are excluded by our cleaning.
- Medians reflect the mix of what sold. The register doesn't record size or type, so a year with more apartments or more large houses shifts the median. We use second-hand homes only to reduce this.
- Starting year matters. 2010 was mid-crash, so "since 2010" and "since the 2013 low" give very different growth figures. We show both.
- Household income is estimated outside 2022. The CSO publishes median household income for 2022 only (and 2016 for towns, on a slightly different basis). Other years are moved with earnings or income-per-person growth, so treat the ratios as estimates. Different income measures give answers about ±0.3× apart.
- "Homes needed" is a floor. Dividing population growth by 2.74 ignores replacing old homes, empty homes and second homes, and assumes household size doesn't fall. The large stock of vacant homes after the crash also met some demand in the early 2010s.
- Regional population is census-only. The CSO has no yearly county population series, so regional demand compares 2011 and 2022.
- Town figures are small samples. Towns are matched by address text, Skibbereen has only 21–80 second-hand sales a year, and the Skibbereen–West Cork electoral area is much larger than the town.
- 2026 is incomplete. Sales run to early October and recent months fill in as late filings arrive.
- Lining up trends is not proof. We use standard economic reasoning to explain why these series move together, but this is not a formal model.
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Sources
- Property Price Register: Property Services Regulatory Authority. Every residential sale, 2010 to 2 Oct 2026 (snapshot imported Oct 2026).
- CSO FY003B: Census population by county, 2011, 2016, 2022.
- CSO FY011B: Census private households and average household size by county, 2011, 2016, 2022.
- CSO PEA01: Population estimates (April), 2010–2026.
- CSO PEA03: Estimated migration (year to April), 2010–2026.
- CSO RAA02: County incomes: disposable household income per person, 2010–2024.
- CSO EHA05: Average annual earnings per employee, 2010–2025.
- CSO GPIIA05: Geographical Profiles of Income in Ireland 2022: median household income by county.
- CSO GPIIA02: Geographical Profiles of Income in Ireland 2022: median household income by town.
- CSO IIA14: Geographical Profiles of Income in Ireland 2016: median household income by town.
- CSO NDA05: New dwelling completions by Local Electoral Area, 2012–2025 (summed to counties and regions; Tullamore and Skibbereen–West Cork LEAs).
- CSO NDA02: New dwelling completions by type (single, scheme, apartment), 2011–2025.
- CSO NDQ09: New dwelling completions by quarter, 2026.
- CSO SAP2022T1T1TOWN22 and Census 2011/2016 small area statistics: Census town populations for Tullamore and Skibbereen.
- CSO URLIA31: Urban and Rural Life in Ireland: price-to-income ratio, 2024.
- CSO HPA06: Residential Property Price Index, annual change.
- CSO HPA09: Residential dwelling property transactions, new and existing.
- Central Bank of Ireland: Mortgage measures: loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits (2015, revised 2023).
- European Central Bank: Key ECB interest rates (rises July 2022 – September 2023, cuts from June 2024).
- Revenue: Help to Buy incentive for buyers of new homes.
Price analysis by HomeIQ from the Property Services Regulatory Authority's Property Price Register. CSO data is used under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence (Source: CSO), retrieved 23 October 2026. Regional and yearly household incomes, price-to-income ratios and "homes needed" are HomeIQ estimates built from CSO figures, not official statistics. This is market analysis, not financial advice.
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